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This paper investigates determinants of yen appreciation for the 
one-year period after the G5 (Plaza) agreement of September 1985. 
During that period, we may identify five waves of appreciation, each 
lasting two weeks to one month, separated by relatively calm periods. 
For each wave and calm period, the changes in the yen/dollar exchange 
rate are decomposed in those taken place in the Tokyo, Europe and New 
York markets. In addition, the correlations among the yen, mark, and 
pound, and the correlations between the yen/dollar exchange rate and 
the long-term interest rate differential for each market for each 
wave are studied. Determinants of each appreciation wave are 
identified by news and regression analyses. 
The identified determinants included the U.S. policy switch (in 
the first w a v e ) , the Bank of Japan, "high interest rate" policy (in 
the second wave), and various mix of the sharp decline of oil prices 
and the decline of the U.S. interest rate (in the third, fourth, and 
fifth waves). 
These findings are consistent with a view that the exchange 
rates respond mainly to news of fundamentals and that the exchange 
rates are not manageable by coordinated interventions alone. 
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This paper examines exchange rate dynamics after the much-hailed 
Group of Five <G5) Meeting of September 22, 1985, held in the Plaza 
Hotel, Mew York. Just before the 65 meeting- many pol icy makers as 
well as economists would have agreed that the U.S. dollar was 
overvalued, The only remaining question was how to bring about the 
dollar depreciation and how quickly it should be done. A one-year 
experience after the 65 agreement was a success in the sense that the 
do1 1ar is depr ec i ated significant!y aga i nst maJ or currenci es; i n 
particular depreciated by over 40% against the Japanese yen. Figure 
1 shows the daily yen/$ exchange rate dynamics from September 1?-
1985 t o Sep t ember 26 - 1986. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
1 -A FIUE UAUES 
It is clear from Figure 1 that the exchange rate changes came in 
"waves - ,f I n a g i ven way e - the yen apprec i at e s by 1 0 or mor e yen i n a 
matter of one week or two, then the exchange rate stays relatively 
calm for two weeks to two months until the next wave- This kind of 
alternating pattern of volatility is a common feature of exchange 
rate movements. (See Mussa (1979).) 
A dramatic announcement at the end of 65 meeting, coupled with 
direct intervention and other measures taken by central banks, 
brought down the value of U.S. dollar "j^ry quickly. This was the 
first wave. The second wave in late October to mid-November was due 
to the action taken by the Bank oi Japan. By December 1985, it 
appeared that coordinated interventions seemed to have worked K^PY 
well, although there was no agreement to why it was so successful. 
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Some consider that the ep isode shows how effectively i^9 gove r r -
ment can manage the exchange rate by interventions BS^6 other 
< mone t ary) policies. Others- however, belie v e t h a t the r ap id depr e-
ci at ion of the dollar was essentially driven by market forces, point-
ing out that the dollar had been gradually slipping for seven months 
prior to the G5 big push. (See Feldstein (1986).) They contend that 
the government intervention was effective only because it was 
"leaning w±±h the wind." If we take a position that government 
actions in a broad sense made a big difference, there still are 
questions. During the first three months after the 65 meeting, was 
it the Japanese side (the Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan) 
which should be given responsibility, since the yen appreciated the 
most? Or, was it the United States team (the Treasury and the Fed) 
which made the difference this time? 
The t h ird wav e of yen ap pr e ci at i on oc cured in late Jan u ar y. 
After this round- Japan became more and more hesitant to support 
further yen appreciation. As the yen appreciated to 175 yen/* in the 
middle of March, the Bank of Japan started intervening again, but 
this time by buying dollars in order to prevent further yen appre-
ciation. In Japan, this operation was nicknamed "reverse interven-
tions." In the six months after the 65 meeting, the trade-weighted 
dollar depreciated more than 15%: the dollar depreciated more than 
25% against the yen, about 20% against the German Mark, and 10/.* 
against the British pound. Apparently, the Japanese authorities 
thought this was enough. However, yen appreciated despite effort by 
the Japanese authorities through mid-May. This can be viewed as the 
fourth wave. The Tokyo summit in May did not yield any agreement on 
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an international monetary reform or a target zone for the exchange 
rates- It seemed that international coordination on the exchange 
rate management was once again in disarray. Major countries were 
unable to agree on whether or not the dollar had to further depre-
ciate- After a brief period of yen depreciation- the last wave 
brought yen to the level of 154 yen/* in August 1. For the rest of 
the year- the foreign exchange market had been relatively quiet. 
Admittedly, the fourth and fifth waves with the brief depreciation 
phase are less sharply distinctive as waves compared to other three 
ep i sodes. 
1.B News Analysis 
In Sections 2 and 3, I will investigate the determinant of the 
exchange rates using intra-daily exchange rate and long-term interest 
rate data. First of all- "news" in this paper is a "surprise 
portion" in any announcement of policy changes or a economic 
development in the market. Lowering the discount rate by 0.5 
percentage point is "not a news," if the change has been "expected" 
in the market. However- if the rate cut is 0.75 percentage point, 
whi1e the expectation has been 0.5 percentage point, the difference, 
0.25% , is a "news." 
Since the foreign exchange market is a we 11-organized, highly 
efficient asset market, relevant information is processed and 
reflected upon exchange rates within minutes. Moreover, unlike the 
country-specific stock market or bond market, the foreign exchange 
market is practically open 24 hours Monday through Friday, somewhere 
in the world. A wave of appreciation should coincide with the 
arrival of a major news about the determinants (fundamentals) of the 
exchange rate. By matching economic and political news with a wave 
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of appreciation, we will be able to identify sources of exchange rate 
changes. However, for this purpose, daily exchange rate data are not 
"fine" enough. The exchange rate responds to news in a matter of 
minutes. For example, if relevant news, say Baker's testimony before 
a Congressional committee, originates in the United States, the 
exchange rate should change during the New York market sessions. By 
the time the New York market closes, the exchange rate is fully 
adjusted to news that became available during the day. 
Time differences make it possible to identify the origin of news 
by looking at changes in respective markets, Since New York is 14 
hours (13 hours during daylight saving time) behind Tokyo, business 
hours of the two countries do not overlap. Thus, it is safe to assume 
that exchange rate changes in the New York market primarily reflect 
U.S. news, while changes in the Tokyo market are primarily caused by 
the Japanese political and economic news. In sum- by looking at 
intra-daily movements of the exchange rate in different countries, 
\ 1 \ 
good inferences on determinants of the exchange rate can be made. 
When the Tokyo market opens two and a half (three and a half, 
during the summer) hours after the New York closing, the Tokyo 
opening exchange rate reflects all the news up to that point. Any 
exchange rate changes during the Tokyo market reflect relevant news 
that becomes available during the Tokyo market hours. For example, 
if the Bank of Japan's policy change is responsible for the exchange 
rate movement, then the exchange rate changes in the Tokyo market 
where the Japanese monetary policy is revealed. 
Let us summarize two basic assumptions of news analysis relevant 
in this paper. First, any news should be reflected by the change in 
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the prices within the period chosen for the time unit of analysis-
Second, major news of one country's policy are announced within the 
business hours of the respective market. 
There is little doubt that the first assumption is satisfied 
with respect to the foreign exchange and bond markets- The second 
assumption may be controversial- since a major news about country's 
policy sometimes breaks after the market in that country is closed. 
For example, President Reagan or Prime Minister Nakasone may conduct 
a press conference or make a TU apprearance after market hours-
Finance Minister or Treasury Secretary could make an important remark 
when they are travelling abroad. If there are notable exceptions, I 
will mention them in the text. However, these exceptions, i.e., 
mismatch of news origin and market response, are not frequent. 
Economists, who do not know exactly what are relevant fundamen-
tals (determinants), can look at the exchange rate changes in various 
markets within the day, and match them with the arrival of news, in 
order to obtain an important insight on the exchange rate dynamics. 
1.C Def i n i t i on 
In this paper, the daily exchange rate change is decomposed into 
the changes in the Tokyo market, the European market, and the New 
York market. Figure 2 depicts how major markets in the world overlap 
each other. We divide changes in the exchange rate in day t, into 
three representative market with the following definitions; 
\ 2 \ 
Definitions of "Changes in the market" 
Tokyo (t) = [Tokyo closing <t>] - [New York closing <t-l)3 
Europe <t) = [New York opening <t)3 - [Tokyo closing <t)3 
New York <t) = [New York closing <t)] - [New York opening <t)3 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The above definitions are not as precise as one could hope for. 
First, because of the overlap of the afternoon hours of the European 
market and the early morning hours of the New York market, anything 
that happens in the London market after 3 pm is attributed to U.S. 
news- whi 1e anything that occurs in the New York mar k e t be f or e 9 am 
is attributed to European news. In particular- some U.S. economic 
indicator announcements, including the producer price and industrial 
p roduc t ion indices oc cur at 8:30 am, before t h e New Yor k f or e i gn 
exchange market opens. Second, as explained above as exceptions to 
the second basic assumption of news analysis, occasional political 
developments take place after the foreign exchange market closes in 
that country. Hence the correspondence between the timing of news 
announcements and market hours is not always perfect. However, as a 
first approximation, this market decomposition of the exchange rate 
movements gives us an initial important sign of the origins of 
exchange rate disturbance. An investigation of market-specific 
changes will provide us with a foundation for exploring determination 
of the exchange rates. 
l.D. The Model, Regression 
The usual signs in covariances between the various exchange 
rates and between the exchange rate and other economic variables are 
implicitly assumed, although I will not present a formal theoretical 
model of exchange rate determination in this paper. In particular, 
the following theoretical predictions are taken for granted. 
Institutional investors are assumed to behave in accordance with 
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a standard port-folio balance model. (See, for example- Frankel 
(1983).) Therefore, an increase in the interest rate in a country 
would cause its currency to appreciate against other currencies. 
We also expect that if the oil price declines, then the pound, 
the currency of a major oil producer, should depreciate- while yen, 
the currency of a major oil importer, should appreciate, 
In order to test these theoretical predictions, news analysis, 
correlation analysis and a regression analysis will be employed. 
News analysis, as explained above, concentrates on the change in 
the yen/dollar exchange rate in various markets, A contribution of 
various markets toward overall changes will be interpreted as a 
geographical source of disturbances. Matching major economic and 
politicl events in the country where major movement occured will 
reveal the source of the exchange rate movements. 
A simple correlation table between the Japanese yen, the German 
mark and the British pound will reveal a lot of information about the 
economic source of major disturbances in the foreign exchange market. 
For example, if the yen appreciates because of the U.S. policy 
..;._."s, then yen movements would be closely correlated with the mark 
and pound movements. If oil is the major source of disturbances, the 
correlation between yen and pound would be negative. 
Finally, a usual regression analysis will complement news 
analysis and correlation analysis, which provide ample evidence about 
the determinants of exchange rate changes. The regressions analysis 
in this paper plays only a complementary role, due to the reasons 
which I emphasized above in explaining why news analysis is more 
appropriate. For example, if the exchange rate responds to "news" of 
? 
expected changes in the monetary policy stance, the regression of the 
exchange rate on the interest rate would not reveal the causal i ty. 
The next section analyzes exchange rate movements, in particular 
causes behind five waves of yen appreciations from the 65 meeting of 
September 1985 to September 1986. In the third section, regressions 
analysis will be carried out to quantify the effects of the interest 
rate on the exchange rate. We will find that each appreciation wave 
is explained as the exchange rate responses to changes, or signals of 
upcoming changes, in "fundamentals." Implications of these findings 
will be discussed in the concluding remarks. 
2~ BLUE UdUES QE XFM 6EeBEC16I10bl 
Let us first prepare some tools for analyzing the determinants 
of waves of yen appreciation. 
As shown in Figure i, the eight-month period after the G5 
meeting can be divided into five waves of yen appreciations with 
quiet periods and one brief depreciation period separating the waves. 
Table 1 shows the decomposition of (level) changes in the yen/* 
exchange rate into the Tokyo, European and New York markets for each 
wave and for the periods in between. Table 2 shows correlation among 
the changes of the three currencies in each market for each 
subper i od. 
TABLES 1 and 2 ABOUT HERE 
Most modern theories of the exchange rate determination 
emphasize the relation between the long-term interest rate and the 
exchange rate. The overvalued dollar problem from 1981 to 1985 was 
often blamed on the U.S. government deficits which created unusually 
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high yield for the government bonds. If long-term capital flows are 
important factor in determining the yen/$ exchange rate, as has been 
suggested by many researcher, we should expect to see that the yen/* 
exchange rate moves closely with the difference in the yen- and 
dol1ar—denom i nated interest rates. 
Figure 3 shows the exchange rate movement (repeating Figure 1) 
by a solid line (with the left scale) and the difference between the 
Japanese and the U.S. long-term government bond yields by a broken 
line (with the right scale) for the one-year period after the 65 
meeting. It is immediately clear that the interest rate differential 
movement and yen appreciation over the one-year period generally 
confirms what the portfolio-balance or monetary theory would predict. 
That is, as the difference between the interest rate narrows, the 
portfolio shifts back to the yen-denominated bonds, thus creating yen 
appreciation. A close examination, however, reveals that the rela-
tionship between the interest rate differential and the exchange rate 
varies for different waves of yen appreciation. 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
A. The 85 weekend 
The 65 emergency meeting was hastily put together on the weekend 
of September 21, 1985. At the time of closing in the New York market 
on September 20, Friday, it was known that the meeting would take 
place but there was no suspicion that anything big would come out of 
it. At the closing of the New York market on the Fridey, the 
yen/dollar rate was 239, little changed from the day before. 
The 65 agreement, also known as the Plaza agreement, that the 
participants wi11 take coordinated actions to depreciate the U.S. 
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dollar, was announced during the weekend. Uhen the first market, New 
Zealand's Wellington market, opened on September 23, Monday, the yen 
\3 \ 
appreciated by 5 yen to 234 yen/"*. The Tokyo market, which would 
have opened next, was closed for a national holiday. The London 
market put 232 yen/*, and appreciation continued during the New York 
market session, opening at 231 and closing at 225,5 yen/*. By the 
time the Tokyo market opened on September 24- yen had already appre-
ciated by more than 10 yen. The Tokyo market opened at 229.7 and 
closed at 230.1, while the Bank of Japan reportedly sold 1.3 billion 
dollars. It was only after the big jump had already taken place that 
the Bank of Japan started a heavy intervention- and the intervention 
did not seem to cause yen appreciation. (It, however, is possible to 
say that it prevented a sharp rebound.) Thus, the Bank of Japan's 
role in the yen appreciation should be minimal at this stage. It is 
safe to say that the initial jump was caused by the "announcement" 
i tself . 
What was new in the announcement then? In answering this 
question, it is useful to investigate what happened one week 
following the announcement. 
B. First Wave: September 23 to September 30, 1985 
Reading statistics of the first wave (September 23- September 
30) in Table 1 (row I), we notice that 85% (=12.675/14.95) of the yen 
appreciation during the week took place in the New York market. 
During the week, central banks of the G5 countries sold U.S. dollars-
as agreed upon in the 65 meeting. It is reported that the amount of 
intervention accumulated in this week by the Bank of Japan surpassed 
that of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. However, the fact that 
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the yen appreciation was concentrated in the New York market rather 
than the Tokyo market suggests that the most important -factor for the 
appreciation was not the Bank of Japan's intervention but news in the 
New York market. Although the Federal Reserve Bank of New York could 
intervene on behalf of the Bank of Japan tltaku Kainyu] or any other-
central banks, the account that non-U.S. central banks have with the 
Federal Reseve Bank of New York show little suspicious movement 
around late September 1985. 
In Table 2 (row I ) , we see that correlations among the yen, mark 
and pound in the New York market during the week of first wave are 
uniformly very high. This also suggests that the dollar was the 
major source of disturbances and the rest of the currencies moved 
together against the dollar. 
Figure 3 shows that the interest rate differential was not the 
factor of exchange rate movement in the week following the G5 
agreemen t. 
This is consistent with a view that a most important aspect of 
the 65 meeting was the change in the U.S. position from benign 
neglect to international coordination. During the Regan-Sprinke1 
regime, the Treasury Department took a position that the dollar was 
strong because of the strong U.S. economy. They denied a link 
between the U.S. fiscal deficit and high interest rates or a link 
between high U.S. interest rates and the strong dollar. Under the 
Baker regime, a need for greater international coordination was 
expressed and manifested itself in to the 65 agreement. It was a 
"surprise" (news) for the market that the Fed intervened in coopera-
tion with other central banks, although the amount of Fed interven-
1 1 
tion was less then the Bank of Japan7s at this point. 
The market must have been more and more conviced of the U.S. 
policy change in the New York market everyday. 
C . Second Ulave ; 
During the first three weeks of October, the yen was stabilized 
at the 214 - 218 range. In fact, from TABLE 1, (the Q row between 
waves I and II) we know that the yen slightly depreciated, with all 
the depreciation taking place in Tokyo, while it appreciated in the 
other markets. 
At this point, many market participants were expecting that the 
dollar might become strong again. Especially when the Seoul Meeting 
of Finance ministers at the occasion of the IMF meeting (weekend of 
October 5) did not produce any follow-up to the Plaza G5, some market 
participants expressed an opinion that the dollar had hit bottom. 
In fact, the exchange rate expectation survey taken among the 
market participants on October 16 in the Tokyo market confirms this 
point. The mean of the survey shows that yen rate would be 214 in 
one month, 21? in 3 months, and 222 in 6 months. (For the nature of 
the survey, see Ito (1987).) 
However, the Japanese authorities judged that the amount of yen 
appreciation was not enough and feared that the dollar might creep up 
to its previous level. Facingwith a confl icting market expectation, 
the Bank of Japan decided to take a stronger action. 
The Bank of Japan announced a major policy change on October 24, 
Thursday. Governor Sumita in a regular press conference announced 
that the Bank would adopt a high short-term interest rate policy. 
The presumption was that narrowing the interest rate gap between the 
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periods, T'he high interest rate pol icy- which caused the second wave -
was gradually eased and formally abandoned on December 17, (The 
t hree-mont h Te ga t a interes t rate peak e d on Nov ember I 9 - t h e on e-mont h 
Tegata rate p,. -n vac ember 13.) The discount rate cut by the 
Bank of Japan- which did not take place until January 30- was rumored 
as early as December 20, These developments might have put pressure 
on the yen to deprec i ate - espec i a 11 y after the mi dd 1 e of Decernber . 
The OPEC countries announced after the December 8 meeting that 
it had de c i de d t o de fend their mar k e t sh ar- e s e v en if It me an t ) owe r 
oil prices. The German nark appreciated a, b o u t ? . 3*a f r om N O V e m to e r 
to January 24, while the British pound depreciated about 1,3 % during 
t he same per i od, The pound depr ec ia t ion seemed to have been caused 
by the decline in crude oil prices, As Japan is a major oil impor-
ter, it would not have been surprising if yen had appreciated during 
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the same period. In other words, it looked rather "artif'.ciaL1 that 
the yen/I value is fixed. while German mark and British pound 
against dollar moved around, <In TABLE 2, the same point can also be 
se e n as u e r y 1ow c or r e1 a t i on s be twe en the yen and the mar k, an d 
between the yen and the pound in the Tokyo market for the period 
be twe e n Nov ember 8 to Jan uary 23.) • 
FIf3URE 3 gives another look at the puzzle in this period. 
Although the second wave was initiated by narrowing the interest rate 
d i f f e r e n t i a 1 < by r a i s i n g t h e Jap an e se 1 on g-1 e rm i r? t e r e s t r a t e ) - a 
correct i on of "ov e r ~sh oo ting" of interest rate differential(i.e.
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widening of the differential) did not cause the exchange rate to 
move, If the interest rate differential was a powerful weapon to 
change the course of the exchange rate from late October to mid-
November, why did the exchange rate stay calm when the interest rate 
differential fluctuate during the rest of November and December 0 
The r e are two poss i b1e e x p1 an a t i on s f or the ap par e n t s t ab i 1 I ty 
of the yen/* exchange rate f rom the beginni ng of November to the end 
of January. The first hypothesis is that as the high interest rate 
policy was gradually lifted, the yen received pressure to depreciate, 
while the oil price decline worked in the opposite direction. The 
two conflicting pressures may have happened to have an equal 
magni tude. 
The se c on d hypo t he s i s is t ha t the Jap an e se mon e t ar y au t hor i ties 
made an attempt to stabilize the yen at around 200. The decision 
might have been made in early November. The interest rate policy was 
adjusted so that the exchange rate level could be sustained. That is 
why the Japanese interest rate continued to climb until late November 
15 
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c.^  d,r:,.,r, 2 ? : d ! d n o t , t o p t h e , ^ , , Q - c.i the a p p r e c i a t i o n . 
• , . .. ;r , hi = :.,.-,ue w a s ^he r a p i d 
H n'j a. j o r c a u =. •=• o i the y en a p p r e •: » * •- ? :-'»' f ; • ' -
oil c,
 :- c , c i ; n e . H m i n o r r o l e ,,,,. D U r . d by the d e c l i n e in the 
... . -.:!•=. fiscal pol icy 
U . y . !
 or: g_ t e r m i n t e r ? •= t r a t e i;.-h i c r-, r •?+»=•- ' - -
sw itch. I ha.ve two k i n d s o +" ey i de r• c c + or t h i s '••> ' ew . 
F . r s t , T-.ble 1 (row I I I ) r e p e a l s that yen a p p r e c i a t i o n 
T A - k e t - • • W h a t : •;• 
p e r i o d took p l a c e a] m e e t a a u a H y in tne m r * * •--•' 
! n tsrfc.( ; ,,Q , ,.. i h s t t h ^ c o n t r i b u t i o n o+ the t'-'r u C " ! ' 
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J a p a n e s e m n n p t ^ r v D O M C V . W h a t i e new a b o u t t h e t n , r u ^ - -
•
 { u . • •,.•-••• I d t h e 
t h
^ ven is a p p r e c i a t e d in the E u r o p e a n m a r k e t , 
:--rkpt^ The onii^f b---- :••.!•?=. ^ • , 1 ^ a ; f ,-.-,,-,
 r ;,-. r ,,:~.r. 
: =• n t ds-'e 1 op^ne r " ~ :••'. o • 1 : r c e = oc a u r a. +" t e r * a p "~r -;..-• 
a n d be-fore t h e N e w Y o r s p ^ f .. -v \ ••-i^!v:l M - : ,-:r n >--*.;:: 
d e c i s i o n s o n •_• • ' ;•-oduc t ; o n a n d p r i c i n g b v *~ -± s p ~ c -,•-«•..,- r ^  ,.-, ~ 
f
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 r. i. n a M,:• v:-< *r ] 3 r, cj s ^ n H ; 
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T h e y e n c o n t 1 r.... O,J ~ 1 . " k P ' ^ c i s t e d , w h i l e o i l p r i c e s s t e a d i l y 
d a c 1 i n a d , A l t h o u g h t h a p o u r d a p p r *:- r i a t e d o M a r 11^ f- .•; P r -. -: 
t i o n , i t a mo-..* a m a r. t .^;a a r5 o t c o n d i s t e n t . It <=.- p m - -:-. -.••*...,.. 
ot D o u n d d e p r e c i a t i o n n e w s •: oi i o r ^ c a d e c l i n e ) a n d a p p r e c i a t i o n n ? , , ; 
»' s o m e t h i n g a "! re ' . In t h i s p e r i o d , w h a f rri i ..-.h f -«-^- p + r - .^.-. ^  -. - -. -* 
= • - •••-••••- v s - ._....,, , s.r u a p r a -
c i a i: a ;- t r: a p o J J •'• d t o a. p p. r a c i a t a ;»'"' 
D n e
 -oasibia source o-f pr.-jnd H-prpr istion -dollar d e p r e c i a t i o n ) 
pressure - a s a gradual change in the **«-***.'* p e r c e p t i o n 0+ the 
r.r^.r..r± of re d u c i n g the U . S . qo^err.rr.er. t b u d ^ t r\**\r>± -n. . u 
budoat d e f i c i t s In the past several >••?=.=,,-•-: -^ •-, .--;-.=,--. i- . . _ . ^  ,-
• • • -• •-•' •- •-• •• --'-i- u.-=«*.!^ u tor c r e a t -
ing U . S . high interest r a t e s and, in turn, a strong d o l l a r . y : -.K.-
first tour rnontrs ot : 986 , p e r c e p t i o n s about -future d e f i c i t s seam t n 
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have c h a n g e d d r a s t i c a l l y , £•-• the bee, • n^ . .• o o* -p:~-." . .' •-;: :-.- a ~ a 
ae c u r i ty -f i r m s - wh I c h h ad be e n p u r c h as i n g Ij , 1 , ' or a. • • t e r- m bon d s , we r e 
rep or ted to h aa e cut ba c k dr ama t j c a 1 \ y on = e c a " .  r .a w, =. e = * "w? r *; = . 
In o r d e r to d o c u m e n t t h . s , let u s turn to F I G U R E 9, ""ne 'orig-
term i n t e r e s t r a t e d ? ff e r e n t ; a 1 n ar r owe d su bs t =* r, t w=w 1 y \ f r om 3 . 6 
p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t to 2,6 p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t ) r o u g h 1/ at the same time 
wi t n the th i rd w a v e • H o w e v e r , no t e the t imi nq of a dec 1 i ne in the 
interest, r a t e d i f f e r e n t i a . ] . T h e d e c l i n e in the d i f f e r e n t i a l , w h i c h 
w a s m air.! / c au s a d by the U . S . i n t e r e s t r a t e dr- op u n l i k e t h e p r e c e d « n g 
w a v e - s t a r t e d clear-! y a f t e r t h e T a k e sh i t a a n n o -..nc e me n t of J a n u ar y 2 4 , 
T h a s < st i s fa i r to s u m m a r ize t h a t the t h i r d war-.' e se erne d to h a.1--1 e 
h e e n tr log e r e d b y F a k e s h i t a •'" =. r • e m a r k o n J a n u a. r >• 2 4 . H --.aw e ;-' e r , the 
11"; < r d u.iaae wa.s parti y b e c a u s e of a.n o v e r - d u e e f f e c t of oil p r i c e 
declines- •", wh I c h p r e c e d e d J a. n u a r y 2 4 ) an d o a r t 1 v be c a u s e of nar r ow i n g 
the i n t e r e s t r a t e d i f f e r e n t i a l ( w h i c h a t a r " a d a f t e r Jan u ary 2 4 > . 
* - • • • : . • - ~ i. ; i .. cr • • •' *r i ! t j 3 i f l D v* t i f f O cU i i^ . O t J d D a i 
A s the t h - r d w a v e b r o u g h t the yen into tne 1ob • a, the J a p a n e s e 
iT{ r,r, ~ i._, - >• .=< y + h or i t i e s be c ame r e a . s t an t to f u r t h e r y en a p p r e c i a t i o n , 
T h e Saw,: of J a p a n s t a r t e d m e n t i o n i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of i n t e r v e n t i o n 
in s u p p o r t of the d o l l a r (sell yen and b u y d o l l a r s ) , a total r e v e r s a l 
o f t h








 *• i »n / u ) in Jan an . (Th a * ar 1 • & a t h e ad 1 i n e a boa t ; t -s :" -"• -"• • ••' ' s ~ 
t V .- p p p =, r-
 e H ,- r. p - p-t,- ,_: a .- y. 4 ^ ^ j. f e n t ^ e ; / e n ,,. h .- ^ .-,._-. • ~ •• . :. - .;: .„ r. S 9 !" 1 ^ U - -J 
T > i
^ a c t u a l r e o e ^ - a e • - t a - •.= erww o " d i d n o t come u n t i l M a r c h I S w h e n y e n 
h i t be 1 ow t h e 1 7 5 >•
 c- a , ± • e •,« .-• • 
rH.i r - i n g t h e ; n t y r-,, , ;
 z^ t w e e n t h e t h i r d a n d f a s - r a --a., a , t r-. e r e w a s 
a n n :
'
;
^ a ; e d e v e 1 c. -mer. t . On M a r c h 6 a n d 7 , F r a n c e , i 3 e r n - > n v r s s r a ^ , ^ n d 
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 ^ -: ! S t e d tr or?. ;;:- . - -
the day o * t h e d I •=• c o u n t rate c u t a. n n c * J r .-• .~ T.... ...•-. . .-. 
l a t e r , wh . a ^  wa = t ur,--ad a r c . -. -' .-.
 : • .- „• ... -. -. ._• 
in a w e e k . I r, t h a t s e n s e , a c o o r d i n a t e d ir-.t-^r-c^ .--*.-
succes s f u 1 in keep i no the e -...ah ange rate s t a b l e * A ] * h.-..•,--
fall and rise immed ia t e1y foilow1n g the rate c u t , 
6. F o u r t h Ulave (April 16 - May 12) 
The f o u r t h w a v e star-ted when the ( s e c o n d ) i n t e r n a t i o n a l 1 y - r 0 n r -
d i n a t e d d i sc ou n t r a t e c u t be c ame a cert a i n t y . c.- —- ^n r , ] i ^  t ~ 
H a y 12- the yen a p p r e c i a t e d by more than 1? yen- b r e a k . n q the a l l -
t i me h i gh on Apr i 1 21 in T o k y o , The mo n e tary au th or i ties in Japan 
did not w a n t t o c au se fu rt he r ap pr e c i a t ion of ye n, Sh or t-t erm 
i ntere s t r a t e s w e n t d o w n q u i c k 1 y a n d r- e v erse i n t e r u e n t I o n c o n t i nue d . 
T a b l e 1 (r ow IU) indicates that most a p p r e c ia t ion took place j n 
T o k y o and N e w Yo r k - L o o k i n g at T a b l e 2 (row P-d) , we see that c o r r e l a -
tions between the three c u r r e n c i e s w e r e quite h i g h . Not only the 
"/en , bu t t n P p ,-u n d an d mar k ap p r e c i a ted At the same t i me , In f a c t , 
a t t n e : e e:-' -"j f a •:» D r- e c i a t i o n , April 2 8 , the G e r m a ri cent r- a 1 fa a n k j. o i n e d 
the Bank of Japan in intervening the rne-.ket in order to support the 
do] 1ar • 
This evidence points to United States monetary policy as a main 
c a -j - *~ o T the* t c u r t h i.i.v.je o t >' e n *. o p r e c ; a * ..,_ . r :-. ~- -t >:,- * *; s ^  t '-a >r-
Lir- « t e d S t -< f e a w a.s a lead! n Q a civ oc :-»t e of the a • a--: r J S t c a r f: s s ,- ": :-
"• P ( n t «"-r- r -'-• ~ this ''' « ew , T h e mar k et r er t i c [ a s n t ~ mu -a t h .?.'••* e t • osr e d c».» * 
that d e s p i t e the- a P p e a r a r. c e o f a ,! c o o r- d i r ate d ;' d . v a o • j r. t r- a t e a a w , ; t 
1 =. mor e l i k e l y t o h aue a larger rs~ ac t on U . S . < 1 on g-ter m> ; rd e r est 
r a 1e s t h a n o n r a t e s i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s -
W h a t a b o u t o t h e r f a c t o r s ? S i n c e the d e c l i n e of oil p r i c e s had 
s t o p p e d by the m i d d l e of A p r i l , oil w a s not the n " - - " o r . T h i s is 
c on f i r me d by r e 1 a t i M e 1 y h I qh c or r e 1 a t i on s b e t w e e n the p ou r. o a~ d yen 
(at least in T o k y o ) , and the p o u n d and m a r k . T h e r e ma;--- he^e been 
soiTie p o l i t i c a 1 ape c u 1 a t i on about a m a j or i n t e r n a t i on a 1 n.on e t ar y 
raforiTi to be d i s c u s s e d at the cn-rdr.Q T o k y o s u m m i t , ! iowev er , it would. 
be h a r d t o q u a n t i f y w hat deal e r s e a pec ted a b :. u t the m C n a t J. r y r e f o r- m 
a n d h o*^ the outc om e (no e x p l i c i t a. q r e e m e n t on a m o n e t a r y ret o r m ) 
a f f e c t e d 1h e f o r e i 9 n e x c h a n g e m a r k e t . 
T h e l o n g - t e r m i n t e r e s t r a t e d i f f e r e n t i a l b e h a v i o r shown \n 
FI C U R E 3 w a s i n ter est i ng be f or e an d dur i n q t he four t h w a v e , D u r i n g 
t h e m o n t h of A p r i l - the 1on g-1e rm in t e re s t rat e d i f f e r e n t i a1 
c o n t i n u t e d to d e c l i n e wi thout a p p a r e n t r e a c t i o n In the y e n / f e x c h a n g e 
r a t e . J u s t w h e n the e x c h a n g e rate s t a r t e d the f o u r t h w a v e - the 
int e r e s t r a t e d i f f e r e n t i a l s t a r t e d w i d e n i n g a g a i n , m a i n l y b e c a u s e of 
a r e a c t i o n by the Bank of J a p a n m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , T h u s , it a p p e a r s 
"rat the interest r a t e m o v e m e n t w a s not the f a c t o r for the f o u r t h 
wave , 
H. The Tokyo Summit and its a*" t -.•;-• me t h -- a period of reversal --
Tne Tokyo S-mmit- held from May 4 to 6f yielded little progress 
on the front of international monetary coordination. Japan reported-
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1 v sought c o o r d i n a t e d .ritsr^r^icri to present the /en * r orr, +^* t ^ " 
a p p r e c i at i on , wh * c h w a s rejected by the Un i t e a •:• • J ". a :' - '< ' - •"" r" •='° < di 
my 1 t i U t e r A! •= u r v e i « • :-.<- r. c e of mac r oe c on cm i c indica.t or .-: •• :s f a r :'D'"•• ^ e z D;' 
t h c- Un i ted S t a t e s , The + i r. .5 1 ear semen t states, t hi a t *. i .= So w i M be 
e x p a n d e d to G7 to include Canada and Italy; 0 ; •< :•": r--.-••: e T> .r. isters 
an d c * n teal bank er s of the G7 c o u n t n e s will c onduc t " fr.i. ; t : : •.< • a r a 1 
s u r v e i 1 a n c e t o rn a k e their best e f f o r t s t o r e a c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n 
ap p ?•• op r 1 a t e r erne d i a 1 me asur e s wh e n e u e r there an e s i gn i f i c an t de v i a-
t i o n s- f r om a n i n t e n d e d c o u r s e and r e c omm e n d t hi a t remedial e f f o r t s 
f o c u s f i r s. t a n d fore m o s t o n u n d e r 1 y i n g p o 1 i c y f u n d am e n t a 1 s , w h i 1 e 
r e a f f i r mi i r. g t h e 1 ? S 3 W j ] 1 I a m s b u r g c omm ; t m e n t t o : n t e r v e n e in e >•: c h a n g e 
mar- k e t s whe n t o do so wou 1 d be helpful , " 
In Tokyo- this agr eerne n t w a s pence iv ed as a me asure not part ic u-
1ar1y helpful in r e l i e v i n g the pressure on the yen to a p p r e c i a t e . 
The agreement gave the impression that J a p a n ' s wish to stop further-
yen appreciation! was- u n w e 1 c om ed by o t h e r s - a. n d t h a t J a s a n h a d b e c om e 
"isolated." In p a r t i c u l a r , the Bank of J a p a n , which w a s almost alone 
in in t e r v ening i n a u p p- o r t o f t h e d o liar- ( s e 1 1 i n g y e n ) , bee am e m o r e 
v u l n e r a b l e to speculative a t t a c k s . The yen a p p r e c i a t e d by about 10 
yen (or 5.9%> , to 160 in on e wee k foilow i n g the summi t (wh i c h defined 
the end of the fourth w a v e ) . 
H o w e v e r , the yen quick}/ turned around and started d e p r e c i a t i n g 
f
-° its level before the summit and then up to the level almost 
c a n c e l l i n g the amount of the fourth w a v e . In f a c t , from M a y 18 to 
June 2, yen deprec i ated more than 11 yen. 
Some people a t t r i b u t e the turnaround to the T r e a s u r y Secretary 
B a k e r ' s testimony in C o n g r e s s on May 13 to the effect that he thought 
the yen had a p p r e c i a t e d e n o u g h . 
T h i s short : ri e a of quick ap p r e c -at- or >" d a a ?:• r e a . a t » or; 
+ o 1 ' QIM i ng t h e summ it m i gh t h ao e bee n a r ar e oc c A 3 j on of a sp a •: u ' e t • •; a 
bubble t o r rri i n g a n d popping. F i r s t , t h ere w a ~ r o r.^ • :• r ^ c.:: r om . c ne w S « 
Ui ) or ; a as were s t a b l e , and major cu'rsnr. i e ~ mere rnov i ng to go t h e r-
(see TABLE 2- the last row.) Second, although the c o r r e l a t i o n s with 
the yen were h i g h , the amount of appreciation in the mark and pound 
i n t h e w e e k a f t e r the s u mm i t w a s m u c hi sm a 1 1 e r than the y en; 1 . 8"/. f o r 
the mark and pound, T h i r d , the depreciation w a s as quick as the 
appreciation and the yen came back to where it w a s . It it w a s a 
bu bb1e - it wou1d n ot be su rprising that the bubble w a s bu r s t by the 
T r e a s u r y Secretar y B a. k e r " s- test! m o n y . 
The summit agreement could be seen as a step toward inter-
n a t i on a 1 c oor d i n a t i on of mac r oe c on om i c p o 1 i c i e s , 0+ c ou r se , h ow mu c h 
can be achieved by "surveillance" r e m a i n s to be seen. It is ironic 
that J a p a n a n d G e r m a r« > - w h i c h in the pa s t f e w y e a r s hi a v e s o u g h t 
m a c r oe c or; om i c c oor d i n a t i or; ( i . e . , 1 owe r i n g the U . S . intere s t r a t e s) 
w a n t e d to set an exchange target zone and coordinated intervention; 
and the United States- which had been unsympathetic toward pol icy 
coordination in the past summit m e e t i n g s , turned around and proposed 
c oor d i n a t i on . If one rec ogn i z e s that inter v e n t i on w i t h ou t f u n dame n -
tal pol icy c h a n g e s is destined to fail , it is difficult to understand 
why Jap an wan te d c oord i n a ted inter v en t ion, 
Eo e n mor e i r- on i c in Mar c h w a s that the c oor d i n a t e d d i sc ou n t r a t e 
cut w a s not put forward by Japan but by the United S t a t e s . It w a s 
the United S t a t e s that almost attempted a unilateral discount rate 
cu t < t hank s t o a power st r ugg1e) - wh i 1e Japan wh i c h the or e t i c a 1 }y 
w o u l d prefer a unilateral interest rate cut to prevent further yen 
a p p r- e c ? ?, t « on < o : ~j not initiate an interest cut or- go f or a laroe r 
cut, I n = t e ad , Jap an pursued unsucc? ssf u 1 I n t^rven t i on . 
J. Fifth Wav e < From June 3 to July 31) 
A long and gradual yen appreciation took place in the early part 
of summer. Since ap pr e c i a t ion du ring t his peri od is much more 
gradual than other waves, it may be' inappropriate to talk in the same 
manner wi t h o t he r s . 
Yen ap p r e c iat ed un i form1y in three mar k e t s, A 1arqe e t fect i n 
the European market in TABLE 1 and a low correlation between yen and 
pound shown in TABLE 2 suggest an effect from oil prices decline as 
was th e c ase in the t h ir d waMe. FIGURE 3 a1so shows t hat t he 
i nterest rate differential pi ayed some role. 
In sum, this final waue was caused by a mix of oil prices 
decline and narrowing of the long-term interest rate differential, 
Yen reached the level of 154 yen/* on August 1- and then stayed 
in the very c1ose range until the end of samp 1e period of this paper, 
3.*. fiEQLfiLSsioa 6aal^sis 
In the preceding section, determinants of exchange rate changes 
were inferred from the intra-daily exchange rate movements, In this 
section- a regression analysis is conducted to investigate the magni-
tude of effects from suspected determinants to the exchange rate. 
T a b 1 e 3 s h o w s t h e re s p o n s e in t h e ye n /* e x c h a n g e rate in the N e w 
York market <9: 15am to 4:30pm) to changes in the long-™term interest 
rate, the stock prices (S&P 500) and the oil prices, The interest 
rate is observed in almost at the same hours with the exchange rate, 
However, the oi 1 pri ces and stock pr i ce i ndex ohservat i ons come on 1y 
daily. Therefore the one-business-day percentage change is used for 
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those variables. The adjusted R sq u a.r e d . s u e r v ] ow , but it I s * 
common feature to this type of regress! or? where the left had s-. be 
variable is very close to, but not quite, a random ^a!k, ^According 
to Hakkio (1986), any tests of the random walk hypothesis has 1 ittle 
power so that the acceptance of the null hypothesis does not imply 
that the actual process is a random walk.) 
When the exchange rate is regressed on one of the three 
'•
?ar i ab 1 es - the on 1 y var table wh i ch has a strong effect on the 
exchange rate within the day is the long-term interest rate- When 
the U.S. long-term interest rate decline by 100 basis point, yen 
depreelates 0.9 percent (e.g., 200 yen to 198) w i thin the same day. 
However, th is does not seem to be a uery strong effect. 
When all three variables are used, the long-term interest rate 
r em a i n s bar e 1 y significant with a srr.a 1 1 e r coefficient, Howe v e r , this 
equation may suffer from the mu1 ticol 1 ineari ty between the long-term 
interest rate and the stock price indexes. Suppose that the monetary 
policy is the driving force- i.e., (news on) the monetary tightening 
or relaxing is the source of shock's. Then both the long-term 
! r! fe re: 1 rate ?r d s t oc H price s a;; 1 1 mov e ( in the op p os i t e direct! on ) 
~> t t n e ~ -* Ti e t * m e % 
t a a rp.r e~- ; t u de IV =. = SIT?a 1 ) for a p o s s i b 1 e c on e l u s i o n that the i n t e r e s1 
• .. " : -.' •:••'*: r- >; rr •- ., '- \- • .- •.:••..-e ". a:': :r-; a ".. J a--.1-?.' * " . a > a .* r
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J.*. Concluding RemacMs 
The success of quick depreciation of the U.S. dollar during the 
week following the 65 agreement gave to some observers the impression 
that if coordinated interventions are made, it is possible to manage 
\9\ 
the exchange rate. However, as argued in this paper, intervention 
itself has played only a minor role in a period immediately following 
the 65 meeting. The U.S. policy changes signaled by Fed interven-
tions were more important in changing market participants' percep-
tions about the fundamentals in the future. Interventions do not seem 
to cause a large change in the exchange rate levels, unless they are 
also signals of policy switch or a change in domestic policies. 
Especially the so-called "reverse interventionM by the Bank of Japan 
intended to stop "too much* yen appreciation after March 1986 was not 
successful, because it was not accompanied by the change in unilate-
ral discount rate change or in stimulating the Japanese domestic 
economy. However, this conclusion does not rule out the possibility 
of "smoothing out" fluctuations by interventions. 
Time to time, the exchange rate appears to respond to what 
Chairman Molker or the Finance Minister Takeshita says. These episodes 
might give an impression that a mere talk could "manage1* or mismanage 
M 0 \ 
the foreign exchange market. However, as discussed in the 
preceding section, it is only under special circumstances that 
announcements of government officials have strong effects. Governor 
Sumita's press interview and Finance Minister Takeshita's remark were 
effective only because Japanese authorities consciously pursued a 
policy of targeting the 200 yen/dollar, the former confirming the 
policy and the latter signaling its abondanment. 
Detailed investigations in this paper using intra-daily data 
27 
reveal that the large changes in the yen/dollar exchange rate levels 
after the 65 agreement were not "managed* by the U.S. and Japanese 
monetary authorities. This paper found that five waves of yen appre-
ciation were, respectively, cause by the U.S. policy switch, the high 
interest rate policy by the Bank of Japan, the decline in oil prices, 
and a mix of prospects of U.S. fiscal deficit reduction and a further 
decline in oil prices. In other words, the exchange rates respond to 
news on what we consider "fundamentals'1 and not to mere interventions 
of the monetary authorities. 
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FIGURE 1 
FIGURE % 
Major Market Hours in 24-hour Clock (Tokyo time) 
Note: Daylight saving time is observed -from the end of April to the 
end of October in New York. During that time, the New York market 
hours should be shifted by one hour counter-clockwise. 
Data Appendix 
The definition of data used in the paper is summarized as follows: 
TKO (t) = the openning (9am) yen/$ in Tokyo at date t-
TKC (t) = the closing (3:30pm) yen/$ in Tokyo at date t. 
NYO (t) = the openning (9am) yen/$ in Mew York at date t. 
NYC (t) = the closing (4:30pm, or later if market is active) 
yen/$ in New York at date t. 
In Tokyo, the interbank foreign exchange market is restricted to start at 
9am and end at 3:30 with a lunch break from 12 noon to 1:30 pm. The 
screen goes blank right at the end of morning session and afternoon 
session. Thus, the openning and closing rates are well defined in Tokyo. 
In New York, the market hours are not well-defined, but the openning and 
closing time are defined from convention. The Tokyo rates are the 
transactions rate, while the New York rates are the simple average of bid 
and ask rates. The data in Tokyo are daily collected from Mihon Keizai 




Decomposition o-f the Yen/* Changes 
! ! Accumulated Yen Changes 
! Total 
Regime Dates ichange ! Decompositions into market o-f 
! i Tokyo Europe New York 
G5 Sep. 20 - Sep. 23 -7.75 <Tokyo closed) { -7 75 "] 
I Sep. 23 - Sep. 30 -14.95 -0.85 -1.425 1 -12.675"] 
Q Oct. 1 - Oct. 24 0.12 4.225 -1.525 -2.005 
II Oct. 25 - Nov. 7 -10.745 . -7.70 I -1.80 0.055 
Q Nov. 8 - Dec. 17 -3.675 -0.12 -0.305 -4.30 
Q Dec. 18 - Jan. 23 -0.30 -0.41 -0.78 -0.825 
III Jan. 24 - Feb. 19 -21.10 \ -7"."775" .. -6784"""" -7.415 | 
Q Feb. 20 - Apr. 15 -2.40 0.64 -4.125 1.21 
IV Apr. 16 - May 12 -17.45 ( -6.91 \ -1.385 |":-67o95~T 
R May 13 - June 2 11.70 5.50 2.92 5.90 
V June 3 - July 31 -21.25 | -6.78 -5.665 -7.155 1 
Q Aug. 1 - Sept. 26 0.985 2.135 -5.85 3.28 
Notes: See a-fter Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
Contemporaneous Correlation o-f Exchange Rate Intra-day Changes 
Yen, DM, UK, 
Tokyo Europe New York 
Yen DM Yen DM Yen DM 
I 9/23 - 9/30 DM .84 .93 I .72 
UK .36 .55 -.51 -.33 | .74 .97| 
Q 1 0 / 1 - 1 0 / 2 4 DM .75 .61 .96 
UK .65 .80 .27 .65 .56 .63 
II 1 0 / 2 5 - 1 1 / 7 DM I .52 I .69 .92 
UK [ .20 . 7 0 ) .63 .72 .85 .94 
Q 1 1 / 8 - 1 2 / 1 7 DM .42 .59 .76 
UK .41 .32 .48 .57 .70 .83 
Q 1 2 / 1 8 - 1 / 2 3 DM .44 .63 . 93 
UK .34 .69 .34 .27 .74 .87 
I I I 1 / 2 4 - 2 / 1 9 DM [ . 8 l " ™ ~ ™ ~-~-~~—~ _ _ _ . -
UK
 I -28 .07 .06 .32 .31 .43 | 
Q 2 / 2 0 - 4 / 1 5 DM .40 .76 . 5 0 
UK
 -29 .33 .52 .53 .40 .50 
IV 4 / 1 6 - 5 / 1 2 DM f T i i I . 8 4 l ^ i i " [ 
U K
 l - 8 * -85 | .58 .84 J .70 . 8 8 \ 
R 5 / 1 3 - 6 / 2 DM .73 .77




 •<-! .72 .82 .'78 .87 
V 6/3 - 7/31 DM T T 4 7 " " 7 7 6 " ~ ~ 5 8 [ 
UK
 I - 2 8 -05 .11 .10 , 85 .36 I 






 -41 .47 .*37 .39 
N o t e s : See nex t p a g e . 
Notes for Tables 
(i) Total change is defined as the change from the N.Y. closing of 
the last day of the preceding regime to the last day of the current 
regime with two exceptions. Exceptions: 85 regime is the change from 
the N.Y. closing on September 20, Friday, to the N.Y. opening of 
September 23, Monday. Note that the Tokyo market was closed on 
September 23, due to a banking holiday. The total change in the 
first regime is defined as the chnage from the opening of N.Y. market 
on September 23 to the N.Y. close of September 30. 
<ii> The daily change in the Tokyo market is defined as the yen/* 
change from the N.Y. close of the preceding business day to the 
Tokyo close of the day. The daily change in the European market is 
defined as the yen/% change from the Tokyo close to the New York 
opening of the day. The daily change in the New York market is 
defined as the yen/* change from the New York opening to the New 
York close of the day. 
The accumulated changes in a regime is the sum of the daily changes 
in the respective regime. Due to country-specific banking 
holidays, the four market changes do not add up to the total change 
of the regime. 
<iii) The regime names, I, II, III, IU and U stand for waMes of yen 
appreciation, and R for reversing period; and Q for a relatively calm 
spel1 . 
<iy) For table 2; Changes in Yen/*, DM/* and UK/* in the specific 
market everyday are measured in the same manner as Table 1. Then the 
correlation matrix is calculated for each regime, each market. 
YEN/*,PU5-PIJR C 0 M P PI PI 
FIGURE 3 
TKC: The yen/* exchange rate (solid line, left scale)* 
The closing rate in the Tokyo market. 
DIFR: The interest rate difference in th* Jar^np-o i-r-^  *. 
ment bonds and the U.S. long-term government bonds = USLR - TftLR 
See NOTES -for precise definitions o-f USLR and JALR 
NOTES to FIGURE 3s 
JALR : The yield of the governmen t bonds w i th abou t ? yea.r t o ma turi t y 
in Japan, An average of bid and ask rate [Tentou Kehai uri , 
kail- From September to December 1985, Bond #68, maturing 
in December 1994, with 6.8% coupon rate, is chosen. From January 
to September 1986, Bond #78, maturing in July 1995, with 6,2/; 
coupon rate, is chosen. In Japan, the long-term government bond 
market is not comparable to the United States, The ten-year bond 
is issued by negotiation between the Ministry of Finance and a 
syndicate of financial institutions. Therefore, the longest 
maturity with market determined rate is the secondary market 
with 9 or more years. Moreover, there is a custom to create 
"designated standard" bonds, which are widely traded and y'\e}d 
significantly lower than others with comparable maturity. Since 
bonds other than the designated bonds have a thin market, we 
choose the rate of designated bonds. 
Source: Nihon Keizai Shinbun, daily. 
USLR: The ten-year government bond rate in the United States, quoted 
at 4:30 pm, New York time. 
Source: ^ ~ -*-,. -^1 Data, 
TABLE 3 
Table oi estimates and (t-statistics) by OLS. 
LHS variable: YEN changes in the New York Market 
Sample period: September 24, 1985 - September 26, 1986. 
ALL SAMPLES 
RHS var. 
period ! interest stock oil -2 DW 
(#OBS) ! rate prices prices R 
all .917 .01 2.01 
<253) (2.40)* 
all -.051 .00 2.01 
<241) (-1.60) 
all .005 .00 2.08 
(25?) (0.24) 
all .704 -.031 .004 .01 2.03 
(241) (1.74)* (-0.91) (0.52) 
SAMPLE SPLIT (REGIME BY REGIME ESTIMATION) 
Phase Dates RHS variables -2 
(#0BS) interest rate R DW 
I&Q Sep.23 - Oct.24 5.94 .08 1.48 
(22) (1.97)* 
II Oct.25 - Nov.7 1.41 .02 2.33 
(10) (0.45) 
Q Nov.8 - Jan.23 1.26 .06 2.16 
(50) (2.20)* 
III Jan.24 - Feb.19 2.48 -.14 1.92 
(18) (0.86) 
Q Feb.20 -Apr.15 1.30 .0? 2.17 
(38) (1.75) 
IV Apr.16 - May 12 -0.23 -.12 1.59 
(13) (-0.16) 
R May 13 - June 2 0.22 -.02 1.59 
(20) (0.13) 
V June 3 - July 31 1.34 -.00 2.12 
(42) (1.29) 
Q Auq.l - Sept.26 -0.12 -.03 2.51 
(40) (-0.15) 
Notes for TABLE 3. 
YEN: percentage change of yen/* in New York market 
= 100*<NYC<t)-NYO<t))/NYO<t) 
NYO(t); Openning <9:15am) quote of the Yen/* rate. 
NYC(t): Closing (4:30pm) quote of the Yen/* rate-
Source: Federal Reserve Bank, New York. 
interest rate: (level) change in the long-term U.S. interest rate 
in the New York market. 
= USLRC(t)-USLRO(t) 
USLRO(t): Openning <9:15am) quote of 10-yr U.S. gov't bond 
USLRC(t): Closing (4:30pm) quote of 10-yr U.S. gov't bond 
Source: Technical Data. 
stock prices: percentage change in the S&P 500 stock prices over one 
bus i ness day. 
= i00*(SP(t)-SP(t-l))/SP(t~i) 
SP(t): S&P 500, stock price index. Closing of the day. 
Source: Data Resources Inc. 
oil prices: percentage change in the oil prices over one business 
day. 
= 100*<DIL<t)-0IL(t-1))/QIL(t-l) 
OIL(t): the spot price of the Ninian Blend (London). 
Source: Data Resources Inc. 
Footnotes 
1. The news analysis has been applied to the exchange rate movement in 
Engel and Frankel (198-4) and Frankel (1984; eh.7). The news analysis 
with the intra-daily exchange rate data was first done by Ito and Roley 
(1986), which analyzed the movement from 1980 up to the G5 meeting in 
Septermber 1985. This paper is a direct sequel of Ito and Roley (1986). 
2. It is possible to define changes in the "Pacific" market (from the 
closing of the New York to the opening of the Tokyo market) and changes in 
the strict Tokyo market (from the opening to the closing of the Tokyo 
market) separately, in place of the Tokyo market as defined here. 
However, Ito and Roley (1986) convincingly showed that there is very 
little news happening to cause exchange rate changes in the "Pacific" 
market. Practically the New York closing is used as the Tokyo opening. 
Aggregating the "Pacific" and strict Tokyo market does not do any harm to 
our analysis. 
3. In fact, the Bahrain market, which is open on Sundays, was the first 
market after the G5 agreement. It was reported that American banks 
started selling the dollars in the Bahrain market on Sunday, September 22, 
but no quotes were reported. 
4. This same quote was translated as "Nations industry could live with 
the dollar valued at 190 yen" (Wall Street Journal, January 27, 1986.) 
Note that the Japanese version states the broadly-defined 190s, with a 
connotation that it does not go too far below 200, while the English 
version states 190 as level. The development in the Europe and New 
York later in the same day was closer to the English version. The point, 
FOOTNOTES 1 
however, was that it signaled the switch of the policy. 
5. Although the Gramm-Rudman Act was found "unconstitutional" in a 
Federal Court on February 7, the Congress made efforts to trim federal 
deficits in the budgeting process. The market must have become more and 
more convinced during the spring of 1986 that efforts for reducing federal 
deficits would be more intensified in the near future whether or not the 
Gramm-Rudraan Act is constitutional. However, I could not pinpoint 
specific events which would prove this conjectures. 
6. Nihon Keizai Shinbun carried a story on April 25 about how Japanese 
investments became "diversified" into European securities. However, a 
security company source indicated that the "diversification" started in 
the beginning of April. 
7. Later we learned that there was a split of opinions (and a power 
struggle) within the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. An anti-Volker 
faction was said to have outvoted Chaiman Volker on February 2-4 in an 
attempt to cut the discount rate (without international coordination). 
However, one member changed position and delayed the rate cut until March 
7. (See for example the Wall Street Journal, Editorial, on March 20 for 
details.) On March 21, the leader cf anti-Volker group, Vice Chairman 
Preston Martin resigned. Since even with coordination, the dollar 
depreciated heavily after the rate cut, it was a wise decision, at least 
as afterthought, to delay it, from the viewpoint of the exchange rate 
stabilization. 
8. The discount rates in Japan, the United States and Great Britain were 
FOOTNOTES 2 
cut by 0-5$ on Monday, April 21. The rumor had been around for a few 
weeks. But information about the decision became known (leaked?) to the 
market on April 16 or 17. The decision was formally made and announced on 
April 18 in the United States and in Great Britain and on April 19 in 
Japan. 
9. The Japanese monetary authorities might have believed in the power of 
the coordinated interventions, since they reportedly sought after a pledge 
from other countries to coordinated interventions in the Tokyo summit. 
10. The foreign exchange market which is sensitive to what cabinet members 
and central bankers sayhas been dubbed in Japan as a "political market" 
(Seiji souba). A column was written about a "political market" in Nihon 
Keizai Shinbun on as early as February 2. When monetary authorities are 
talking about the target level of the exchange rate without real interven-
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